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Are Payday Loans Really Evil? 
Controversy, Regulation, and Innovation 
in the Secondary Financial Services Market
DaviD StoeSz
University of Illinois–Springfield 
Department of Social Work
Stagnant income and persistent debt have induced low- and 
middle-income households to rely on alternative financial ser-
vices (AFS): buy-here-pay-here auto loans, check-cashers, payday 
loans, auto title loans, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, and 
pawnshops. A secondary financial services market has evolved to 
serve the secondary labor market, replete with trade associations 
as well as state and federal regulators. Mainstream financial in-
stitutions have marketed innovations, such as reloadable debit 
cards, to appeal to low- and middle-income consumers. High fees 
and interest rates of AFS products have fueled a volatile debate 
about the future of the secondary financial services market, 
with options including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.
Key words: debt, alternative financial services, AFS, secondary 
financial services, secondary labor market
The Secondary Financial Services Market complements the 
economic circumstances of workers in the Secondary Labor 
Market, whose chronically low-income, limited upward mo-
bility, and susceptibility to expense shocks cause them to resort 
to Alternative Financial Services (AFS). As AFS product inno-
vation has proceeded apace, an ensuing controversy about 
the relationship between poverty and AFS has led to reactive 
reform strategies, including prohibition, regulation, and inclu-
sion. Proactive reforms that would provide constructive finan-
cial products to low-income households include Community- 
based financial services through community credit unions and 
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the post office. Schools of social work have only recently begun 
to include financial services training in their curricula. 
The expansion of Alternative Financial Services (AFS) 
reflects the consolidation of a Secondary Financial Services 
Market that serves workers in the secondary labor market. In 
the U.S., economic dualism has been examined extensively 
through analysis of the labor market. Michael Piore proposed 
a theory of dual labor markets in 1970, contrasting a primary 
labor market consisting of jobs that were salaried, paid well, 
included benefits, and were part of a career trajectory as 
opposed to a secondary labor market composed of hourly pay 
at low wages, with few, if any, benefits, which offered no career 
advancement and were often temporary or seasonal. Jobs in 
the secondary labor market, often high-turnover, include “the 
hourly staff of security-guard services and janitorial services 
and the floor staff of fast-food restaurants and some types 
of stores, such as supermarkets and low-priced department 
stores” (Bewley, 1995, p. 233). Wholesale, retail, and service 
sector firms typically justify low wages because of staff turn-
over, absenteeism, insubordination, as well as petty theft and 
pilferage. Because of the flat wage profile of employees in 
the secondary labor market, workers tend to move laterally 
from job to job as opposed to upwardly into the primary labor 
market (Wachter, 1974). 
The psychological implications of the secondary labor 
market are profound with respect to upward mobility: “sec-
ondary jobs do not require and often discourage stable working 
habits, wages are low, turnover is high, and job ladders are 
few. Secondary jobs are mainly (though not exclusively) filled 
by minority workers, women, and youth” (Reich, Gordon & 
Edwards, 1973, pps. 359-360). Structural features of the sec-
ondary labor market impede ascent into the primary labor 
market, and:
 
dual labor theory focuses attention on structure that 
endures irrespective of changes in human capital or 
with effort. It also focuses on missing rungs on career 
ladders, gaps that prevent upward mobility and sticky 
jobs that hold some workers to lives spent toiling in 
unrewarding, insecure, low-wage jobs. (Hudson, 2008)
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The stratification of financial markets has become part of 
the nation’s economic structure (Olen, 2012), as described by 
Mayer (2010): 
Affluent households were served by the commercial 
and industrial banks. These institutions made loans in 
large sums at low rates of interest but only to salaried 
professionals with good credit and reliable co-signers. 
The credit unions served working people but were tied 
to places of business, usually the larger employers. 
While their rates were low, they asked a lot of questions 
about what the money was for and supervised 
borrowers more closely. They served the better risks 
in the middle strata of the workforce. Pawnshops, by 
contrast, dealt with a clientele that lived in straitened 
circumstances and could only get cash by mortgaging 
a piece of personal property at a big discount. (p. 84)
In response to the economic circumstances and needs of 
lower-income households, AFS thrived, evolving to become 
part of the cultural infrastructure of low-income communities. 
The relationship between financial services markets and labor 
markets is depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. Dual Labor Markets and Financial Services
Labor Market Occupations Financial Services
Primary 
  Salaried with 
  career track 
  and benefits
Professionals, managers, 
unionized workers,  
business owners
Savings and checking accounts, 
retirement portfolios, mortgages 
and auto loans, tax and investment 
consultants
Secondary
  Hourly wages 
  without career 




ricultural workers, day 
and seasonal laborers, 
contingent workers
Check-cashing, money orders, buy-
here-pay-here auto sales, payday 
loans, rent-to-own, pawn 
The American economy could provide a continuum of 
financial services, of course, products serving the range of 
economic groups while responding to their discrete prefer-
ences; however, the bifurcation of financial markets is evi-
dence that structural factors, practices of mainstream financial 
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institutions, and the preferences of consumers contribute to 
the evolution of the Secondary Financial Services Market. 
Structural factors include dualism in the labor market, regional 
economic disparities, and cyclical downturns. In addition, im-
migrants competing for low-skilled jobs, declining union mem-
bership, and automation pushed wages lower (Appelbaum, 
Berhardt & Murname, 2003). Practices of mainstream finan-
cial institutions, primarily banks and credit unions, have ef-
fectively excluded lower-income households; for their part, 
the unbanked and underbanked have responded to minimal 
balance requirements, high fees for managing accounts, penal-
ties for overdrafts, rigorous loan underwriting, and inacces-
sibility with respect to location, inconvenient hours of service, 
and lack of receptivity of staff by defecting from mainstream 
financial institutions to AFS. 
Windfalls
Economically speaking, workers in the secondary labor 
market face constant impediments, their plight poignantly 
portrayed in Nickel and Dimed by Barbara Ehrenreich (2001) 
and The Working Poor by David Shipler (2004). Michael Weiss 
has disaggregated the secondary labor market according to 
consumption patterns, income, and location, describing such 
marketing clusters as “rural industria” (low-income blue collar 
families), “blue highways” (moderate/blue collar farm fami-
lies), “back-country folks” (remote rural villages), and “hard 
scrabble” (older families in poor, isolated areas). Consumption 
patterns, such as preferences for country music, Mountain 
Dew, and pick-up trucks, complement regional labor markets 
where jobs at low-wage retailers, including Wal-Mart and 
McDonalds, predominate, evidence of reciprocity between 
commerce and labor (Weiss, 2000, p. 13). 
In their efforts to reconcile low-wages with consumption 
demands, workers in such circumstances often make im-
provident decisions, maxing-out credit cards and incurring 
overdrafts. Olen (2012) coined the term “money scripts” to 
define the mind-set of consumers whose credit reach exceeds 
their economic grasp (p. 20). So, as Pew researchers found, of 
payday borrowers who had used a credit card, 59 percent had 
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maxed-out their limits, and 52 percent had over-drafted their 
checking accounts during the previous year, a problem that 
was exacerbated when payday lenders caused overdrafts for 
27 percent of borrowers who bounced a check for repayment 
on a loan. Given the financial straits of many lower income 
families, the default payment option mandated by state law 
becomes important for payday borrowers: 
When the default was a two-week repayment, the case 
in Washington state, 90 percent of borrowers failed to 
opt for an available, extended repayment plan, while 
the automatic default of a 180-day installment loan 
was the choice by 86 percent of borrowers in Colorado. 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, pp. 31-37)
Payday borrowers viewed loans not as a regular bill, even 
when they frequently resorted to such loans, but as a quick 
infusion of cash. Accordingly, many payday borrowers used 
windfalls, especially tax refunds, to close outstanding loans. 
One in six, or 17 percent, of payday borrowers used a tax 
refund to pay off a loan. “The large windfall provided by a tax 
refund enables borrowers to repay a loan principal that their 
regular paychecks are not sufficient to cover” (Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2012, p. 27). In the boom-and-bust personal finances of 
workers of the secondary labor market, such a strategy may be 
considered rational.
Controversy
Political battles have erupted over AFS, lending an air of 
siege over the Secondary Financial Services Market. Biblical 
injunctions against usury have animated opponents of payday 
lending, especially in the “Bible belt.” After prohibiting 
payday lending in 2001, the North Carolina legislature is con-
sidering permitting such loans once again (Woolverton, 2013). 
Other jurisdictions have instituted interest rate caps that ef-
fectively prohibit payday loans; in 2008, Ohio limited interest 
to 28 percent, while the District of Columbia put in place a 24 
percent interest rate cap in 2007. In its most recent survey of 
state regulations, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
reported that thirty-eight states permitted payday lending to 
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varying degrees (Morton, 2013).
The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) has served as a 
source of information for opponents of financial products and 
practices that it considers exploitive of low-income, dispropor-
tionately minority populations. Created in 2002 as a nonprofit, 
CRL has been supported by prominent foundations and has 
issued several reports focusing on “predatory lending.” In its 
advocacy, CRL analysts have argued that a majority of bor-
rowers are victims of predatory lenders. In 2012, CRL received 
a MacArthur Foundation “Creative & Effective Institutions” 
award.
CRL has worked in tandem with the Consumer Federation 
of America (CFA), which was established as a nonprofit in the 
mid-1960s to represent consumers’ rights. Representing 300 
advocacy organizations nationwide, CFA addresses a range of 
financial services, including payday and auto-title loans, fo-
cusing on abusive practices: “Cash-strapped consumers run the 
risk of becoming trapped in repeat borrowing due to triple-digit in-
terest rates, unaffordable repayment terms, and coercive collection 
tactics made possible by check-holding” (Consumer Federation 
of America, 2013, p. 1, emphasis in original). For networking 
purposes, CFA maintains a listserv for advocates of regulat-
ing what it considers abusive lending practices. CFA was an 
advocate for the Military Lending Act (MLA) of 2007, which 
instituted a 36 percent limit on interest rates charged on loans 
to members of the military and dependents.
Short of prohibition, opponents of AFS have advocated a 
36 percent interest rate limit on loans, which equates to prohi-
bition, since lenders insist that interest rate is too low for their 
business model. A penultimate strategy of AFS opponents 
has been strict regulation. Thus, limiting fees and interest, re-
stricting the number of loans annually, outlawing consecutive 
roll-over loans, and requiring “cooling-off” periods between 
loans are methods that have been advocated by opponents of 
payday loans to make them less harmful to consumers (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2012, p. 20).
The controversy over AFS centers around habitual use, 
with opponents conceptualizing a “debt trap” when consum-
ers resort to products repeatedly, incurring charges that ex-
acerbate their already fragile finances. For example, CRL has 
argued that five or more payday loans per year constitute a 
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“debt trap” from which consumers have difficulty escaping. 
Evidence and logic dispute the debt trap concept, however. 
Using Oklahoma payday data, CRL analysts calculated that 
”90 percent of business is generated by borrowers with five or 
more loans per year, and over 60 percent of business is gener-
ated by borrowers with 12 or more loans per year” (King & 
Parrish, 2007); yet, subsequent analysis of the same data found 
that 43 percent took out fewer than 5 loans per year, and that 
74 percent took out fewer than 12 (Veritec, 2007). Patterns of 
consumer usage, in other words, reveal a standard distribu-
tion, with more economically marginal households resorting to 
payday loans more often; however, they tend to repay prompt-
ly, especially if they anticipate the need for future loans. The 
logic of the debt trap has been disputed by economist Thomas 
Sowell, who notes that payday loans are short-term loans, and 
that computing a three digit APR is analogous “to the price of 
salmon as $15,000 a ton or say a hotel room rents for $36,000 a 
year, when no consumer buys a ton of salmon and few people 
stay in a hotel room all year” (Sowell, 2011, p. 2). 
Other economists have put the matter in more pedestri-
an terms, calculating the implications of using payday loans 
to resolve hypothetical expense shocks: One involved $100 
needed to avoid a $35 payment penalty for a utility bill. 
Assuming the loan was repaid promptly, a payday loan at 
$15 per $100 borrowed was $17.39 less costly than the late 
payment penalty fee. Another involved a $300 auto repair for a 
vehicle needed for work. Compared to the costs of alternative 
transportation, the payday loan at $15 per $100 borrowed was 
$14.55 less costly (Elliehausen, 2009, pp. 17-18). Significantly, 
neither of these scenarios factor in the more dire consequenc-
es of a utility shut-off or loss of employment, which would 
make the payday loan even less expensive than such draco-
nian outcomes. Opponents of AFS had hoped that the cre-
ation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, would introduce federal regulations on an industry that 
had been the province of the states (Tomasky, 2013). In 2007, 
Elizabeth Warren had proposed creating a consumer financial 
protection watchdog, similar to the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, to regulate AFS. Subprime “financial prod-
ucts are dangerous, and any consumer who is not careful is 
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inviting trouble,” she argued, “And yet, dangerous or not, mil-
lions of Americans engage in billions of credit transactions, 
adding up to trillions of dollars every year.” As conceived by 
Warren, this entity,
would be charged with responsibility to establish 
guidelines for consumer disclosure, collect and report 
data about the uses of different financial products, 
review new financial products for safety, and require 
modification of dangerous products before they can be 
marketed to the public. (Warren, 2007, p. 4)
Subsequent jockeying around CFPB regulations of AFS 
have left its opponents disappointed, as lobbyists have con-
vinced lawmakers to exempt their products, such as the carve-
out of car loans, and obstructed the appointment of a perma-
nent director (Weise, 2013).
Opponents of AFS have been fighting a rear-guard action 
insofar as the Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA) 
and Community Financial Services Association of America 
(CFSA) have not only been receptive to regulation but also en-
couraged installment loans as a default for delinquent borrow-
ers. Moreover, mainstream banks and credit unions continue 
to offer small dollar loans (SDLs), similar to payday loans, as 
well as other financial products for lower income consumers. 
While the demand for AFS products is likely to be robust, at-
tempts to regulate them are also likely to continue.
Product Innovations
The AFS market has become more established as a result of 
maturation of the industry, technological innovations, and the 
incursion of mainstream financial institutions. As noted above, 
“best practices” promoted by AFS trade associations include 
defaults for delinquent borrowers that convert payday loans to 
installment loans. This is not only in the best interests of bor-
rowers, since installment loans extend the time for repayment, 
but also lenders, who stand to lose the principal if no payment 
is made.
The internet has altered AFS fundamentally by allowing 
vendors to evade state regulators. Because they enjoy sover-
eignty, Tribal Lending Entities (TLEs) have the opportunity 
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of competing in a global AFS market. Much of the growth in 
payday loans, for example, has been a result of online lending, 
which has grown from $5 billion in 2006 to $18.6 billion in 2012 
(Hecht, 2013). Tribal sovereignty notwithstanding, the CFPB 
will probably attempt to clarify internet lending by TLEs 
(Miller, 2013).
The emergence of General Purpose Reloadable (GPR) debit 
cards is a growing market for unbanked consumers wanting an 
alternative to a conventional checking account. Major vendors 
of reloadable debit cards, such as AccountNow, Rush Card, 
Emerald, Green Dot, and NetSpend, have found consumers 
willing to pay nominal monthly fees for access to ATMs and 
card reloading. When cardholders’ employers make direct 
payroll deposits and cardholders access cash from ATMs, GPR 
cards are less expensive than conventional checking cards. 
Moreover, when consumers use GPR cards for bill payment 
and their cards report to credit bureaus, GPRs can contribute 
to a credit history. The inclusion of savings and loan options 
would make GPR cards even more functional for unbanked, 
low-income households (Rust, 2013).
Recognizing the expanding AFS market, mainstream fi-
nancial institutions have offered payday loans and bank 
advance loans for account holders (Borne & Smith, 2013). 
In March 2013, American Express and Wal-Mart rolled-out 
the Bluebird card. Customers from the military, recipients of 
Social Security and other government benefits, and taxpayers 
expecting refunds will be able to deposit funds directly into 
Bluebird Accounts that will be insured by the FDIC. In addi-
tion, Bluebird will provide pre-authorized checks and allow 
account holders to check balances in real time ("American 
Express," 2013). Offered through Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest 
retailer, Bluebird promises to reach millions of unbanked and 
underbanked customers, providing direct access to low-in-
come households (Morrison, 2013).
The consolidation of the secondary financial services 
market continues apace as banks, retailers, and marketers craft 
financial products for the working poor. The entry of Wal-Mart 
into the arena, which has been long suspected of considering 
a bank charter, reflects the viability of the Secondary Financial 
Services Market. The entrance of major retailers and main-
stream banks into the Secondary Financial Services Market 
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through GPR cards may presage expanding GPR card func-
tions to permit bill payment, savings, and possibly SDLs. All of 
this will be regulatory fodder for the CFPB (2013); and, while 
there is little doubt that regulations will be imposed on AFS, 
the likelihood is that any constraints will conform to the re-
quirements of trade associations representing vendors of the 
Secondary Financial Services Market.
Reactive Policy Options
The sturm und drang of AFS opponents, directed at 
vendors and their trade associations, has not yet produced 
corresponding industry corrections as had been hoped via the 
CFPB. Regardless, chronic debt by low- and middle-income 
households, a prolonged recession, and the entry of main-
stream financial institutions into the AFS sector, promise tur-
bulence for the Secondary Financial Services Market, at least 
in the near future. In this context, three policy strategies have 
evolved with respect to the burgeoning AFS sector: prohibi-
tion, regulation, and inclusion. 
Prohibition, or its equivalent through interest rate and fee 
caps, reflects an impulse that has been evident since the found-
ing of the republic, making unlawful those activities that have 
been deemed morally offensive, including alcoholic beverages, 
lotteries, and abortion. Making activities for which there is sig-
nificant demand illegal, however, not only drives them under-
ground where providers tend to offer a product that is inferior, 
if not outright dangerous, compared to that available through 
legitimate purveyors, but also obligates government to the 
costs of oversight, prosecution, and incarceration. Currently, 
15 states prohibit payday lending, compared to 28 that permit 
such loans (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). 
Regulation of various industries, by contrast, allows them 
to operate in the open, affording a measure of surveillance, 
permitting government to tax transactions as well as a means 
for penalizing noncompliant businesses. Regarding payday 
lending, 8 states have established rigorous regulatory schemes 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). CFPB may introduce national 
regulation of AFS, which has been largely the province of state 
regulators. 
Inclusion encourages financial service providers to 
make products more available for those who are not in the 
economic mainstream, especially workers in the secondary 
labor market. Innovative financial products, such as a GPR 
card with a savings function, could not only be inclusionary 
but also propel the upward mobility of low-income house-
holds. In 2006, the FDIC established the Advisory Committee 
on Economic Inclusion for this purpose. Primary obstacles of 
inclusion are the very structural and psychological factors that 
maintain the Secondary Financial Services Market. 
While these strategies will consume the attention and re-
sources of those concerned about AFS, a larger issue remains. 
The Secondary Financial Services Market, replete with high 
interest rates and fees affixed to financial products for low-in-
come, high-risk consumers, provides access to credit that may 
stabilize their financial circumstances but at a price that jeop-
ardizes their long-term prosperity.
Proactive Policy Options 
Ultimately, the dual financial services market problem will 
be resolved in the same way it will be for the dual labor market 
problem, by constructing more rungs in the ladder of upward 
mobility. Two agendas have evolved around the American 
Dream: anti-poverty measures of the New Deal and War on 
Poverty located primarily in the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services, and a subsequent array of tax expendi-
tures situated in the Treasury Department. 
Public welfare consists largely of public assistance and 
social insurance that were created by the Social Security Act of 
1935 and amplified during the 1960s with the War on Poverty. 
The intricacies of these programs are beyond the scope of this 
article, but it would be fair to conclude that they are embed-
ded in American social policy due to their popularity, as in 
Social Security and Medicare, as well as their essentiality, as in 
Supplemental Security Income. The greatest controversy has 
been around the means-tested public assistance programs—
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, for-
merly Food Stamps), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children), 
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and Medicaid—which are targeted for the poor, who are dis-
proportionately minorities. 
The eligibility for public assistance programs, dictated 
by a means-test on income as well as assets, limits family re-
sources from about $1,000 to $3,000, meaning that minimally 
prosperous families, such as those with a dependable auto-
mobile needed for work, are ineligible for benefits. TANF’s 
“work-first” strategy, through which recipients must take the 
first available job, discourages recipients from searching for 
optimal employment, and the practice of many states to dis-
allow job training and education consigns many poor house-
holds to dead-end jobs. Noncompliant welfare recipients face 
benefit sanctions through which assistance is cut or terminated 
altogether. The federal five-year time limit and even shorter 
state-imposed time limits discontinue benefits for families 
transitioning from welfare to work, a poignant problem for 
those who need training and education to secure well-paying 
jobs and for the poorest families that require long-term support 
(Lawinski, 2010; Ridzi, 2009). 
A decade after its inception, welfare reform achieved dis-
parate outcomes: many welfare recipients were employed, yet 
eligible for other public assistance programs, such as SNAP 
and Medicaid; concurrently, the percentage of TANF-eligible 
families actually receiving benefits (“take-up rate”) dropped 
from 84 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 2003 (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2007, p. 18). Put another way, in 
1996, 68 families received TANF out of every 100 poor house-
holds; by 2010, only 27 families out of 100 poor households 
benefited from TANF (Trisi & Pavettti, 2012).
 Most of those eligible for, but not receiving benefits were 
children, of course (Epstein, 2010), underscoring the urgency 
of their parents’ need for income. A Faustian bargain had 
evolved for low-income American families. Absent adequate 
income, workers in the secondary labor market were confront-
ed with suboptimal institutions: public assistance through a 
non-responsive welfare apparatus or reliance on high-priced 
AFS products. 
Tax expenditures were used to benefit low-income workers 
through public policy beginning in the 1970s with the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). As a tax credit, the EITC added to 
a lengthy list of benefits by virtue of exclusion from taxation: 
15
corporate pensions, health insurance coverage, and the inter-
est on mortgages. Significantly, such tax credits enjoyed broad 
bi-partisan support, allowing Republicans and Democrats to 
show their allegiance to middle-class voters. As a refundable 
tax credit, however, the EITC paid a rebate to families whose 
income fell below a certain level (Holt, 2006). By the end of the 
20th century, tax credits, several of which were also refund-
able, had been crafted to address specific concerns: the Welfare 
to Work Tax Credit, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, the 
Child Tax Credit, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and the 
Adoption Tax Credit, among others (House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2004). By 2005, 15 states complemented the federal 
EITC with state refundable tax credits for low-income families 
(Holt, 2006).
Refundable tax credits had several advantages. Foremost, 
the volume of revenues was significant: for example, the EITC 
benefited 22 million low-income families $41.2 billion in 2006, 
and the Child Tax Credit was projected to benefit 35 million 
families $52 billion in 2010 (Urban Institute, 2008). Moreover, 
tax credits were open-ended. Unlike TANF, which was capped 
at $16.5 billion annually, the amount refunded by tax credits 
was contingent on the number of eligible tax filers. Tax credits 
also avoided the welfare assets test: refunds were apportioned 
according to earned income, regardless of the tax filer’s wealth. 
In 1986, the EITC was indexed for inflation, thus the value of 
refunds increased automatically, a provision that had not been 
affixed to AFDC/TANF. Finally, tax credits avoided the stigma 
of welfare. Instead of repeated visits to an impersonal welfare 
department, tax credits were accessed by filing a W-1040 elec-
tronically or by mail. An important indicator of the value of the 
tax credit paradigm is the take-up rate, which approximated 
75%, far above the 50% typical of public assistance programs. 
Thirty years after enactment of the EITC, $205 billion in tax 
expenditures have benefited low-income families (Cramer, 
Rourke, Cooper, & Luengo-Prado, 2009). 
While tax credits have eclipsed TANF in the volume of 
benefits for poor families and the strategy has enjoyed bipar-
tisan support, it has demerits. Accessed through the Internal 
Revenue Service in the spring, refunds are available at one 
time; although they can be spread over the year as a wage sup-
plement, few tax filers take this option. Moreover, beneficiaries 
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must participate in the tax system in order to receive refunds; 
an unknown, but probably sizable number of the poor prefer 
the informal, underground economy to meet their economic 
needs. Almost certainly, a large portion of undocumented im-
migrants remains unbanked for fear of risking deportation.
Limited access to public assistance and the time restriction 
of tax expenditures, coupled with the growth of AFS, justify a 
new organizational strategy to address poverty: Community 
Based Financial Services (CBFS). Such financial services would 
offer an array of products, including checking, savings, small 
dollar loans, tax preparation, and financial literacy education. 
Account holders would have a personal advisor, an account 
manager, to help them maximize benefits from various sources 
in order to construct a plan to assure their upward mobility. 
CBFS organizations would be private, probably nonprofit, al-
though Yunus (2010) has proposed a for-profit, social business 
model to address poverty. Significantly, consumers would be 
able to choose their CBFS organization, encouraging vendors 
to be responsive to service demand. Two candidates for CBFS 
have been proposed: Community Credit Unions and financial 
services at local post offices.
Following subsidies to establish credit unions in poor 
neighborhoods through Community Development Financial 
Institutions Fund, Stoesz (2000, 2013) has proposed Community 
Credit Unions (CCUs) as a means to provide financial servic-
es while building capital in low-income communities. CCUs 
would be licensed and regulated by the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), and provide an array of traditional 
products, such as savings and checking, as well as innovative 
services, such as micro-finance and Individual Development 
Accounts, short-term loans, and tax preparation in order to 
maximize tax refunds for workers and employers. Assistance 
to consumers would be provided by an account manager who 
would not only help members maximize benefits, but also 
assist them with other financial objectives related to home 
ownership, business development, and higher education/vo-
cational training. Community groups would be allowed to pe-
tition local government to provide public assistance through 
CCUs, effectively chartering welfare departments. By 2014, 
the National Federation of Community Development Credit 
Unions boasted 250 members in 46 states serving 2.5 million 
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members (National Federation of Community Development 
Credit Unions, 2014).
Another alternative would be to provide financial servic-
es at local Post Offices (POs), as has been the case in many 
European countries. In January 2014, the Inspector General of 
the United States Postal Service proposed expanding its finan-
cial products to unbanked consumers. This plan would expand 
money orders, already sold at POs, to include reloadable debit 
cards as well as international remittances. Currently 38 percent 
of the nation’s 35,000 POs operate in ZIP codes without a bank, 
so this plan would directly fill a vacuum left by mainstream 
banks that have abandoned poor neighborhoods. The PO 
projects that providing services to just ten percent of the un-
banked would divert $8.9 billion to the postal service, a much 
needed revenue stream for the beleaguered institution (U.S. 
Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, 2014). Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, as well as Democratic Congressional leaders, 
endorsed the proposal, but it quickly encountered opposition 
by Republicans (Becker, 2014). AFS trade associations would 
likely oppose the PO proposal.
Staffing Community Based Financial Services
The deployment of an effective network of CBFS providers 
rests in large measure with the quality of its staffing. Most AFS 
personnel acquire their skills by on-the-job training accord-
ing to employer priorities and industry “best practice” stan-
dards. Credit unions and the Post Office require a high school 
diploma for counter services with an undergraduate degree 
for supervisory responsibilities. Administrative positions in 
financial services are typically reserved for employees with 
graduate degrees in business or a related discipline. A handful 
of business schools now offer special programs in “social en-
trepreneurship” that promote economic justice through market 
principles (Bornstein & Davis, 2010). 
Since the publication of Michael Sherraden’s Assets and 
the Poor (1991) and the emergence of a network of organiza-
tions advocating asset building, social work has expressed 
renewed interest in economic justice. Returning to a field that 
it had abandoned for a half-century, social work found other 
disciplines had assumed control (Stuart, 2013). Currently three 
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schools of social work offer curriculum in financial services: 
Arizona State University, the University of Maryland, and 
several forming a collaborative in New York City (Birkenmaier, 
Kennedy, Kunz, Sander, & Horwitz, 2013), a modest gesture 
given the scale of AFS. Bolstering social work’s presence in the 
Secondary Financial Services Market would require raising the 
visibility of financial capability in professional education. 
Within social work, a standardization of the 
requirements of certification in financial capability 
would facilitate a coordinated approach in social work 
education and continuing education efforts. One way to 
progress toward standardization is an interprofessional 
commission that could study the financial capability 
field and research, make recommendations to the 
relevant professions about standardization and 
certifications, and consider next steps. (Collins & 
Birkenmaier, 2013, p. 318)
A late arrival to AFS, social work has much ground to regain 
compared to other academic disciplines that educate students 
in financial services, such as business, economics, and human 
ecology (formerly home economics). Educating students in fi-
nancial services is problematic if a network of CBFS vendors 
has not evolved to employ them. CBFS could be capitalized 
through Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), financial instruments 
through which government pays investors according to their 
achieving predetermined social outcomes. If predetermined 
objectives are not met, investors lose their money. New York 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, MDRC, and Goldman Sachs ne-
gotiated an SIB to reduce recidivism among older adolescents 
sentenced to Riker’s Island. As analysts explained, 
In a SIB, investors provide financing to operate federal, 
state, or local-run programs that aim to achieve 
predetermined outcomes. Generally, these outcomes 
are expected to save government money, for example, 
by reducing the need for beds in prisons or homeless 
shelters. The government entity agrees in advance that, 
if the program meets its goals, it will use the savings to 
pay back the original investment, plus a return. (Butler, 
Bloom & Rudd, 2013, p. 1)
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Goldman Sachs calculated its investment of $9.6 million 
would generate positive returns once recidivism dropped at 
least ten percent, outcomes determined by the Vera Institute 
of Justice (Loeser & Levine, 2012). Given the scale of the 
Secondary Financial Services Market, SIBs represent a logical 
candidate for financing a network of CBFS.
Conclusion
The Secondary Financial Services Market has expanded 
significantly in recent decades, driven by demand for AFS 
products. Carrying high fees and interest, AFS are harmful 
for many workers in the secondary labor market; however, 
in the absence of more constructive options, financially dis-
tressed households have little recourse other than resort to the 
Secondary Financial Services Market. The access to AFS prod-
ucts has been essential for millions of lower-income workers 
not only when routine expenses exceed income, but also when 
dealing with emergencies. Reactive policy options are unlike-
ly to provide constructive financial services to lower-income 
families, compared to the deployment of Community Based 
Financial Services, such as through Community Credit Unions 
or Post Offices. Social Impact Bonds are an innovative means 
for capitalizing CBFS. Professional training in financial capa-
bility could provide lower-income families with services that 
would introduce them to an array of financial products de-
signed to accelerate their upward mobility. Along with busi-
ness, economics, and human ecology, social work could con-
tribute to the professionalization of financial services, given its 
historic concern for economic justice.
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